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Abstract
In this paper education simultaneously affects growth and income inequal-
ity. More education does not necessarily decrease inequality when the
latter is assessed by the Lorenz dominance criterion. Increases in educa-
tion first increase and then decrease growth as well as income inequality,
when measured by the Gini coefficient. There is no clear functional re-
lationship between growth and measured income inequality. The model
identifies regimes of this relationship which depend crucially on the pro-
duction and schooling technology. Conventional growth regressions with
human capital and inequality as regressors may miss the richness of the
underlying nonlinearities, but viewed as approximations may still provide
important information on the nonlinear relationship between growth and
education.
Keywords: Education, Growth, Inequality, Policy
JEL Classification: O4, I2, D31, H2
∗I am indebted to Tony Atkinson, Frank Cowell, Berthold Herrendorf, Jin-Kwon Hyun,
Oded Galor, James Mirrlees, Eugene Smolensky, and Robert J. Waldmann for helpful insights
and suggestions. I have also benefitted from comments made by participants of the 2005
meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) meeting in
Paris. Furthermore, I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their very constructive and
careful comments. The usual disclaimer shields all of them.
†Correspondence TU Darmstadt, FB 1/ VWL 1, Schloss, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany.
phone: +49-6151-162219; fax: +49-6151-165553; e-mail: rehme@hrzpub.tu-darmstadt.de
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the dual role of education played in explanations of how
income inequality and economic growth are associated.
It is often shown that human capital and education are potentially important
driving forces in the determination of long-run growth. See, for instance, Lucas
(1988), Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994), Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), or Be´nabou (1996a).
Secondly, the link between distribution and growth has been analyzed in many
contributions.1 See, for example, Galor and Zeira (1993), Bertola (1993), Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (1995) or Per-
otti (1996). The consensus emerging from these theoretical and empirical studies
is that across countries inequality is negatively associated with growth.2
That consensus has recently been challenged by Deininger and Squire (1998),
Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), Barro (2000) and others who find non-robust
or even positive associations, suggesting that income inequality might be good
for growth, especially in rich countries.
However, these latter studies suffer from various methodological and data
problems. For example, many of these studies do not use consistent income con-
cepts and resort to so-called ”unadjusted inequality measures” which are mixes
of Gini coefficients for gross and net income.3 The consequences for any empir-
1That literature is surveyed by e.g. Be´nabou (1996b), Bertola (2000), or Aghion, Caroli,
and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (1999).
2Recent results indicate that there does not seem to be a robust relationship between in-
equality and growth within countries over time. For instance, Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) show
that there is little variation in within country income dispersions over time. Atkinson (1998),
in turn, finds that for the G7 countries the income dispersions have changed significantly over
time. However, based on compilations of inequality data from household surveys, it has been
found that inequality varies substantially across countries.
3Sometimes they also add Gini indices for consumption expenditure to their ”unadjusted”
measure of income inequality. On the importance of income and recipient concepts in the
1
ical investigation of the inequality-growth nexus, especially for linear, OLS-like
models, has been pointed out by e.g. Rehme (1999), Rehme (2002), or Rehme
(2003b). There it is found that the linear relationship is negative - at least for
rich countries -, when income is measured consistently.4
Clearly, the usual focus on linear relationships in empirical work is the stan-
dard approximation argument, because tackling issues of non-linearity usually
raises a whole set of complicated questions.5 Against this background Banerjee
and Duflo (2003) have recently presented theory and empirical evidence that the
growth-inequality relationship appears to be nonlinear. This seems to be a step
forward in untangling a possibly complex relationship. However, they also use
”unadjusted” inequality measures (mixes of Gini coefficients) so that the results
have to be interpreted with caution.
In this context the present paper makes the following points: First, it is argued
that education simultaneously affects growth and (income) inequality.6 Second, it
is shown that the often used Gini coefficient generates certain predictions by con-
struction which may have adverse effects for testing linear relationships between
inequality and growth. Third, in the model the relationship between (measured)
inequality and growth is highly nonlinear and depends on important structural
parameters. This may have important consequences for empirical research.
In the model human capital is taken to be lumpy and can be identified with
degrees. People are hired as high-skilled workers in the labour market only if
measurement of income inequality see, for example, Atkinson (1983), Lambert (1993), and
Cowell (1995).
4Notice that in all these contributions the maintained theoretical relationship is also mod-
elled as being nonlinear. They then focus on deriving some consequences for linear empirical
models and present empirical evidence for the latter.
5In defence of linear models it may be argued that it may be quite interesting to know
whereabouts we are on some possibly complicated (looking) curve.
6Thus, the paper builds on contributions such as Galor and Zeira (1993), Sylwester (2000)
or Eicher and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (2001).
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they have obtained a degree. The source of income inequality lies in the pro-
duction process, because high and low-skilled people are imperfect substitutes in
production
That raises the question what forces determine the labour force mix in pro-
duction. Tinbergen (1975), chpt. 6, has argued that there is a race between
technological development and education so that differences in the human cap-
ital composition may be caused by the demand side of an economy (e.g. skill-
biased technological change).7 However, contributions such as Katz and Murphy
(1992) or Murphy, Riddel, and Romer (1998) provide evidence that the dominat-
ing forces at work are more likely to be supply driven. Therefore, in this paper
the supply of education is taken to win Tinbergen’s race in the long-run.
In the model the government provides education and finances it by raising a
tax on the resources (wealth) of all individuals.8
In equilibrium growth is positively related to human capital only up to a
certain point, since the government takes resources away from the private sector
in order to finance education, which discourages investment and reduces growth.
On the other hand it generates more high-skilled people which exert a positive
effect on production. For high growth taxes and so the number of high-skilled
people must not be too high. Thus, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship
between growth and education.9
Next, the effects of education on personal income inequality are analyzed. It is
7Thus, the paper should be viewed as complementary to recent models along the lines of, for
instance, Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Acemoglu (1998), or Caselli (1999). For empirical evidence
on skill-biased technological change see e.g. Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000),
or Beaudry and Green (2000)
8Thus, even those who have not received education contribute to financing it. That is
realistic in most public education systems and may be in the low-skilled people’s interest as is
e.g. shown by Johnson (1984), Creedy and Francois (1990), or Rehme (2003a).
9For instance, Castello´ and Dome´nech (2002) analyze how human capital inequality bears
on growth. They find that the relationship is negative.
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shown that the well-known Lorenz curves cross when there are more high-skilled
people. Thus, no clear welfare ranking is possible for the (wage or total factor)
income distribution. See Atkinson (1970). The result highlights that it matters
what assumptions one makes about welfare weights attached to bottom or top
incomes in distributional analyses and what inequality measure one uses when
assessing overall income inequality.
Due to the availability of inequality data from Deininger and Squire (1996)
many recent studies have employed the Gini coefficient as the indicator of income
inequality. Investigating the model’s implications for the Gini coefficient reveals
the following: Increases in the number of high-skilled people first increase and
then decrease measured inequality in wages and personal factor incomes. Thus,
there is also an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and education.
This feature of the model is in line with a result in Fields (1987) who shows that
the Gini coefficient often exhibits this shape by construction when incomes are
rising.
The non-linear relationships between growth and education as well as inequal-
ity and education imply that it matters for empirical analyses, which investigate
the link between inequality and growth, where each function attains its maximum.
One can identify regimes under which growth would appear to be positively or
negatively associated with inequality. These relationships would hold conditional
on the number of high-skilled people present. If one considers increases in educa-
tion as a development process, then the model predicts that in the early stages of
development, when relatively few people are educated, growth, but also inequal-
ity would rise when education rises. Then there is a stage where inequality rises
or falls and growth falls or rises. Thus, no clear prediction is possible in that
case. Knowledge of the production and education technologies, and of the level
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of education where inequality and growth attain their maximum is necessary to
determine which regime an economy or a cross-section of economies is in. Finally,
when there is abundant education, growth and measured inequality would both
decrease as the number of high-skilled people increases.
For empirical studies this implies that linear regression models may miss some
of the non-linear relationships between measured inequality and growth. Many
studies based on linear empirical models have found that inequality and growth
are negatively associated in cross-sections of countries. This finding is in line with
a particular regime in the model, but it only holds conditional on a particular
level of education and a given production and education technology.
The main insights to be gained from the paper are the following. Increases
in education first increase and then decrease growth as well as income inequality,
when measured by the Gini coefficient. There is no clear functional relationship
between growth and measured income inequality. If one conditions on inequality
and human capital in growth regressions, the estimated effect of inequality on
growth may be spurious, but may still provide important information on the
nonlinear relationship between growth and education.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes income inequality. Section 4 derives the relationship between growth and
inequality and discusses its empirical implications. Section 5 provides concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economy that is populated by N (large) members of two represen-
tative dynasties. The population is stationary and the two dynasties consist of
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high-skilled workers, Lh, and low-skilled workers, Ll, where Lh, Ll denote the total
numbers of the respective agents in each dynasty. The difference between high
and low-skilled labour is ”lumpy”, that is, either an individual has received higher
education certified in the form of a degree and is then considered high-skilled or
an individual has received basic education with no degree and remains in the
low-skilled labour pool.10
Agents are assumed to have infinite lifetimes and skills depreciate in such a
way that the government needs to maintain education spending in order to keep
a constant proportion of skilled workers in the labour force.
Each (adult) worker supplies one unit of either high or low-skilled labour
inelastically over time. All agents initially own an equal share of the total capital
stock, which is held in the form of shares of many identical firms operating in a
world of perfect competition. Thus, all agents receive wage and capital income
and make investment decisions.11 Furthermore, aggregate output is produced
according to
Yt = At K
1−α
t H
α, Hα = [(Lh + Ll)
α + Lαh ] , 0 < α < 1, (1)
10This assumes that agents are endowed by some basic ability and receive basic education
which is produced and provided costlessly. In the paper education is always meant to be higher
education. Ex ante everybody is a candidate for receiving (higher) education, that is, ex ante
there is excess demand for education and once in the education process agents will complete
their degrees. The education process is taken to be sufficiently productive in converting no skills
into high skills. Even if people have the same innate abilities and the same initial endowments
and although the capital market functions perfectly, there is inequality in the present value
of lifetime earnings in the model. Thus it concentrates on a technology based explanation
of inequality. For a recent model studying the effects of differences in wealth or ability on
education, income inequality or growth see, for instance, Chiu (1998).
11Postulating an equal initial wealth (capital) distribution is a simplification, which serves
to bring out clearly the effects of different policies on the income distribution. Alternatively,
suppose a third type owns all the initial capital stock and there is no social mobility. Then one
may verify that all the results for governments representing high or low-skilled workers hold.
Also, as will be shown below, the workers’ utility depends on the balanced growth rate so that
analyzing high and low-skilled workers embodies a problem that is very similar to the one a
pure capitalist class would have.
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whereKt denotes the aggregate capital stock including disembodied technological
knowledge,12 H measures effective labour in production, and At is a productivity
index at time t.
Modelling production in this way relates to work that distinguishes between
tasks performed for a given educational attainment of the labour force and ed-
ucation mixes for given tasks. See e.g. Tinbergen (1975), chpt. 5, and Lindbeck
and Snower (1996). More precisely, the production function is a reduced form
of the following relationship: By assumption effective labour depends on tasks
requiring basic skills and tasks requiring high skills. These tasks are imperfect
substitutes in production. On the other hand it is assumed that low and high-
skilled people are perfect substitutes in performing basic tasks. Thus, high-skilled
people are multi-tasking and always perform the tasks of low-skilled people in
the model, but low-skilled people can never execute tasks that require a degree.
See Appendix A. Notice that each type of labour alone is not an essential input
in production.
The government runs a balanced budget, uses its tax revenues to finance
public education and commits itself to preannounced policies. It maintains a
constant ratio of expenditure Gt to its tax base
13 and taxes the agents’ wealth
holdings at a constant rate τ . The capital stock per capita is kt =
Kt
N
so that
Gt = τktN = τKt and
Gt
Kt
= τ for all t. Thus, real resources are taken from the
private sector and used to finance public education, which generates high-skilled
12Thus, technological knowledge is taken to be a sort of capital good which is used to produce
final output in combination with other factors of production. For an up-to-date discussion of
these kinds of endogenous growth models see, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1998), chpt. 1.
Notice that the paper abstracts from the important phenomenon of skill-biased technological
change and should, therefore, be viewed as complementary to recent models along the lines of,
for instance, Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Acemoglu (1998), or Caselli (1999).
13Capital taxes keep the analysis simple and are supposed to capture a broad class of tax
arrangements. Time consistency is imposed in order to focus on the long-run effects of education
policies. For a similar approach in a different context see Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
7
workers.
The reason for concentrating on public education14 is that secondary as well
as tertiary education are primarily financed publicly. For example, in the OECD
countries only 23 percent of the funds going into tertiary education are provided
privately. For all levels of education it is only 13 percent. See e.g. OECD (2001),
”Education at a Glance 2001”, Table B3.
In the model all agents are identical ex ante so that innate ability or initial
wealth differences are not important. Furthermore, problems arising from the
time spent receiving education are ignored by assuming that education is provided
as a public good and that all people spend the same time in school, but attend
different courses leading to different degrees.15
In general, public education is ’produced’ using government resources and
other factors such as high-skilled labour itself. That is captured by the following
reduced form of the education technology, which relates the percentage of high-
skilled people to the education expenditures in terms of the tax base,
x = τ  where 0 <  ≤ 1 , (2)
x denotes the percentage of high-skilled people in the population, xτ = τ
−1 > 0
and xττ = (−1)τ −2 ≤ 0. Thus, if the government channels more resources into
the education process, it will generate more high-skilled people, xτ > 0. However,
doing this generally becomes more difficult at the margin. This is supposed to
reflect that, if xττ < 0, more public resources provided to the education sector
14The effects of public vs. private education on growth and inequality have, for instance, been
analyzed by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), or Bra¨uninger and
Vidal (2000).
15Opportunity costs of education might easily be introduced into the model by subtracting
a fixed amount of happiness from a high-skilled person for having spent time in school. The
paper’s results would not change in that case.
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lead to a decreasing marginal product of those resources due to congestion or
other effects.
The parameter  measures the productivity of the education sector for a given
policy.16 If  < 1, the education sector is relatively more productive than when
 = 1. Thus, if  < 1, then a marginal increase in taxes increases education
output relatively more. Underlying that is the description of an education sector
with spillovers from, for instance, high-skilled to new high-skilled people or where
the capital equipment such as computers makes the education technology very
productive. For a justification see appendix B.
2.1 The Private Sector
There are as many identical firms as individuals and the firms face perfect com-
petition and maximize profits. By assumption they are subject to knowledge
spillovers, which take the form At =
(
Kt
N
)η
= kηt with η ≥ α. Thus, the aver-
age stock of capital, which includes disembodied technological knowledge, is the
source of a positive externality.17 Then simplify by setting η = α which allows one
to concentrate on steady state behaviour. For a justification see Romer (1986).
As the firms cannot influence the externality, it does not enter their decision
16The reduced form directly relates the percentage of high-skilled people (x) to the percentage
of resources (wealth) going into the education sector (τ). Let pr = xτ denote the productivity
of the education sector. Then pr = τ −1, which is decreasing in  for given policy. For a
justification of the reduced form set-up see Appendix B.
17Here the assumption is that regardless of the source of new ideas or blueprints production
is undertaken so that all agents are affected relatively equally from knowledge spillovers. The
results would not change if the externality depended on the entire capital stock instead.
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directly so that
r = (1− α)kαt K−αt Hα,
wh = αk
α
t K
1−α
t
[
(Lh + Ll)
α−1 + Lα−1h
]
,
wl = αk
α
t K
1−α
t (Lh + Ll)
α−1 .
(3)
Notice that for a constant x the structure of the production function implies that
r is constant.
The individuals have logarithmic utility and own all the assets which are
collateralized one-to-one by physical capital. As each type of worker lends capital
to firms in a competitive capital market, all individuals face the same interest
rate. Each high- or low-skilled individual owns ki units of the capital stock and
takes the paths of r, wh, wl, τ as given and solves
max
ci
∫ ∞
0
ln ci e
−ρt dt (4)
s.t. k˙i = wi + (r − τ)ki − ci i = l, h (5)
ki0 = k0 = given, ki(∞) = free.
Equation (5) is the worker’s dynamic budget constraint.18 The condition
ki0 = k0 captures that the agents own the initial capital stock equally.
The solution for this problem is standard and involves19
γ =
c˙i
ci
= r − τ − ρ (6)
lim
t→∞
ki e
−(r−τ)t = 0. (7)
18This allows the workers to hold different shares of capital over time. I thank an anonymous
referee for pointing this out to me.
19See e.g. Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), ch. 4.
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The last equation requires that the agents’s wealth holdings approach a value
of zero asymptotically. It reflects the well-known transversality condition which
rules out that individuals incur debts forever.
Equation (6) implies that consumption of all workers grows at the same rate
in the optimum. We assume that the agents are sufficiently patient, namely, that
r−τ > ρ, which implies that consumption grows at a positive rate and will ensure
that the utility functional converges. Thus, the consumption growth rate depends
on the after-tax return on capital. The property of equal consumption growth
reflects the fact that the workers are price takers in the labour market. This means
that their wage income does not feature in their decision how consumption should
grow. Thus, the model builds on Bertola (1993) who shows that incomes from
the non-accumulated factor of production do in general not bear on growth in
endogenous growth models.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
For equilibrium the labour markets for high and low-skilled workers clear and all
people are employed. For the rest of the paper let Lh ≡ xN and Ll ≡ (1− x)N
where x denotes the percentage of high-skilled people in the population N , and
normalize by setting N = 1. Then the factor rewards in equilibrium (see eq. (3))
are given by
r = (1− α)(1 + xα) , wh = αkt(1 + xα−1) and wl = αkt. (8)
For constant x the return on capital is constant over time and wages grow with
the capital stock. As wh = wl (1 + x
α−1), high-skilled labour receives a premium
over what their low-skilled counterpart gets. That reflects the fact that the high-
11
skilled may always perfectly substitute for low-skilled labour so that both types
of agents receive the same wage wl for routine tasks and that performing high-
skilled tasks is remunerated by the additional amount wl x
α−1. The premium
depends on the percentage of high-skilled labour in the population, grows over
time at the rate γ and is decreasing in x for a given capital stock.
Thus, in a perfectly competitive labour market the high-skilled, more produc-
tive workers get a wage premium over and above what their low-skilled colleagues
receive. The relative wage premium, wh/wl, depends negatively on the number
of high-skilled people, which captures an important and realistic aspect in the
explanation of wage inequality. See, for instance, Freeman (1977), Bound and
Johnson (1992), or Autor, Krueger, and Katz (1998).20
From the production function one immediately gets γy = γk so that per capita
output and the capital-labour ratio grow at the same rate. Thus, Y/K will be
constant so that total output also grows at the same rate as the aggregate capital
stock. In equilibrium wit = dikt where dh ≡ α(1+xα−1) and dl ≡ α are constant.
Thus, wages grow at the same rate as kt. In a steady state all variables grow at
constant rates.
Let γki ≡ ˙kitkit and γk ≡ k˙tkt where kt = KtN = K since N = 1 by our normaliza-
tion. At each point in time xkht + (1− x)klt = kt = Kt.
As all agents own the initial capital stock equally, kh0 = kl0 = k0, this boils
down to
xk0e
γkh t + (1− x)k0eγkl t = k0eγkt
xe(γkh−γk)t + (1− x)e(γkl−γk)t = 1.
20Notice that wl does not directly depend on x. It only does so indirectly through kt(x)
in equilibrium. See Johnson (1984). Hence, more human capital is taken to have a stronger
immediate impact on the wages of the high-skilled than on the wages of the low-skilled. On
this see e.g. Bu¨ttner and Fitzenberger (1998).
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It is not difficult to see that, as soon as at least one γki is not equal to γk, the
last equation will not be satisfied for any t. It will, however, be satisfied when
γkh = γkl = γk. Thus, when variables grow at constant rates, equilibrium requires
that each high- or low-skilled agent accumulates wealth at the same rate γk.
In appendix C it is shown that the agents will accumulate wealth at the same
rate as the consumption growth rate. Hence, in the steady state equilibrium we
have balanced growth with γkh = γkl = γk = γy = γ = γch = γcl = r − τ − ρ.
That implies equal investment decisions of the individuals and so an unchang-
ing wealth distribution. Thus, all agents continue to own equal shares of the total
capital stock over time. This is because the model has no transitional dynamics,
that is, the economy is always on a balanced growth path, and consumption,
wealth and income all grow at the same common rate for both types of individ-
uals.
The equilibrium also entails that agent i’s consumption at each point in time
is given by
cit = ci0 e
γt = di k0 e
γt + ρ ki0 e
γt = wit + ρkt. (9)
Hence, in equilibrium the relatively richer high-skilled agents consume more
than the low-skilled individuals at each point in time. That also means that
the welfare of the low-skilled is less than that of the high-skilled. For empirical
evidence on this see, for example, Easterlin (2001). Second, notice that the
marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is unity for both groups.
But consumption in terms of wage income, cit/wit, is higher for the relatively
poorer, low-skilled agents.21
21This raises the question whether, for example, the introduction of a consumption loans
market could serve to eliminate different consumption levels. It can be shown, however, that in
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From (6), (8) and τ = x
1
 one obtains γ = (1− α) (1 + xα)− x 1 − ρ and22
dγ
dx
= α(1− α)xα−1 − 1

x
1

−1
and verifies lim
x→0
dγ
dx
= +∞, lim
x→1
dγ
dx
< 0 since 1

> α(1−α) so that the slope must
change sign at least once. Furthermore, dγ
dx
= 0 implies that
xˆ = [α(1− α)] 1−α , and τˆ = [α(1− α)] 11−α
maximize growth, which is strictly concave in x since for  ≤ 1 and any x ∈ [0, 1]
d2γ
(dx)2
= −α(1− α)2xα−2 − 1

(
1

− 1
)
x
1−2
 < 0.
Thus, dγ
dx
changes sign only once so that growth is first increasing then decreasing
in x. This captures that it is possible that an economy has high-skilled workers,
but does not necessarily do better than another economy with less high-skilled
people. The reason for growth to decline with skill abundance are congestive cir-
cumstances and increased education costs. For a description of this phenomenon
this model no perfect loans market would come into being. This is because in a perfect market
equilibrium the rates of return on assets would have to be equal. Otherwise, one group would
end up with all the assets in the economy and the others would mortgage their entire assets and
wage income. This is unrealistic, especially because there is always the return on capital for
loans to firms which must be equal for both groups in any equilibrium. Also, in any optimum
the agents would suffer reductions in consumption when borrowing and when intertemporal
solvency is required. Hence, no such market would survive into the future or would come into
being in the first place - at least not when agents are not concerned about the other group. A
more formal argument for this reasoning is available from the author on request.
22The model, of course, implies γ(x(τ, ), α, ρ). However, policies differ widely across countries
and α,  or ρ are difficult to measure so that xmay be a good observable proxy for the underlying
differences. As regards endogeneity Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) argue that at a more
abstract level, ”... we wonder whether the very notion of exogenous variables is at all useful in
a growth framework (the only exception is perhaps the morphological structure of a country’s
geography).” However, there may be other exceptions one may think of such as differences in
willful actions, social fabrics, languages, or historical incidents. In the logic of this model such
differences lead to different policies (τ) and so human capital and growth.
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see, for instance, Temple (1999), p. 140.
The effect of a change in the productivity of the education sector for a given
x ∈ (0, 1) is given by dγ
d
= ln(x) x
1

2
< 0. Hence, a reduction in , that is, making
the education technology more productive, raises growth.
Lemma 1 The growth rate is first increasing and then decreasing in the number
of high-skilled people. A more productive education technology raises growth.
3 Income Inequality
In the model all income differences are due to differences in wages. This is justified
by the fact that empirically the main source of inequality stems from differences
in wage incomes. See, for example, Atkinson (1998), p. 19.
As growth is often related to measures of gross income inequality, the paper
also concentrates on the distribution of (personal) gross (of tax) income at a
particular time. This is motivated by current research that has employed data for
inequality measures of current, personal incomes.23 See, for example, Deininger
and Squire (1998), Forbes (2000), or Barro (2000).
In this section we will first analyze the effect of changes in human capital on
wage inequality. In a second step we look at the distribution of personal factor
income, that is, personal wage plus capital income.24
The section will establish that for wage as well as total personal income no
clear inequality ranking will be possible according to the Lorenz dominance cri-
23When one relates growth to income inequality one should ideally look at an average of
personal incomes over time. But data for the calculation of inequality of lifetime incomes do
not exist for a large number of countries.
24Personal income so defined, of course, ignores other sources of income like rents. As these
other sources play a small role compared to the wage and capital income component of personal
incomes we take these two sources as the prime indicators of personal income. See, for instance,
O’Higgins, Schmaus, and Stephenson (1989).
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terion. Furthermore, it will be shown that when wage or personal factor income
inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, there is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between inequality and the fraction of high-skilled people in the
population.
3.1 Inequality in Wage Incomes
A common concept for the evaluation of income inequality is the Lorenz curve.
A Lorenz curve (LC) relates population shares to income shares.
From equation (8) we obtain the relative wage premium as
pi ≡ wh
wl
= (1 + xα−1) with
dpi
dx
= (α− 1)xα−2 < 0.
Clearly, pi is decreasing in x. The mean wage income at time t is given by
µw ≡ (1− x)wl + xwh = (1− x+ xpi)wl = (1 + xα)wl,
where the time subscript has been and will be dropped in what follows for con-
venience. Total wage income is equal to mean wage income, µw, since N = 1.
The share of the total wage income going to the low-skilled is swl ≡ wl(1−x)µw so
that the Lorenz curve looks like figure 1 below.
The LC has a kink at the point A at which (1− x) percent of the population
receive swl percent of total wage income. An increase in x implies that the new
kink at B will be to the left and below A. The movement down follows because
swl is decreasing in x. The new LC will cut the old one as shown in the figure by
the following reasoning: For any Lorenz curve the slope of each line segment is
given by the ratio of each group’s average income to the overall average income.
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Figure 1: Lorenz Curve
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See Bourguignon (1990), p. 219.
Thus, the slope of the lower line segment of the Lorenz curve for wage income,
denoted λw, is given by
λw ≡ wl
µw
=
1
1 + xα
which is less than 1. For this segment one finds
dλw
dx
= −αx
α−1
1 + xα
< 0 and
d2λw
dx2
= −α(α− 1)x
α−2(1 + xα)− α2x2α−2
1 + xα
> 0. (10)
Thus, λw is decreasing in x.
The slope of the upper line segment is given by
Λw ≡ wh
µw
=
piwl
µw
= pi · λw.
This is also decreasing in x, since both pi and λw are decreasing functions in x.
Thus, the new LC must cut the old one from below.
This implies that no clear welfare ranking is possible according to Atkinson
(1970), because the new LC does not Lorenz-dominate the old LC. Lorenz dom-
inance would be given if the new LC lay entirely above the old one. Under that
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condition the new LC would then be unambiguously preferred on welfare grounds.
Thus, the effect of more human capital on (wage) income inequality may be
positive or negative depending on whether one looks at the upper or lower part
of the LCs. In order to assess this one would have to use an inequality measure
that puts particular welfare weights on the bottom and top parts of the income
distribution. Thus, extra assumptions would be needed to justify the use of an
inequality measure that deals with this problem.
Instead of discussing the possible inequality measures that one may use we
will now focus on the Gini coefficient which has been used widely in the recent
growth-inequality literature. The Gini coefficient measures the area between the
Lorenz Curve and the 45o degree line as a fraction of the total area under the 45o
degree line. A Gini coefficient of 0 (1) reports perfect equality (inequality).
From the Lorenz curve one may calculate the Gini coefficient for wage incomes
as
Gw = 1− 2
[
(1− x) swl
2
+ xswl +
(1− swl )x
2
]
= 1− (swl + x) (11)
where the expression in square brackets represents the area under the LC. Recall
that swl =
wl(1−x)
µw
= λw(1− x) = 1−x
1+xα
. Then the effect of an increase in x on Gw
is given by
dGw
dx
= −ds
w
l
dx
− 1 = −
[
dλw
dx
(1− x)− λw
]
− 1.
For low x this expression is positive, because lim
x→0
= −dλ
w
dx
= −−αx
α−1
1 + xα
= +∞,
whereas for higher x we have lim
x→1
dGw
dx
= 0+
1
1 + 1
− 1 = −1
2
< 0. Furthermore,
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for all x ∈ [0, 1] we have
d2Gw
dx2
=
dλw
dx
− (1− x)d
2λw
dx2
+
dλw
dx
< 0
since dλ
w
dx
< 0 and d
2λw
dx2
> 0 by (10). Thus, for all x ∈ [0, 1] we have that dGw
dx
is strictly decreasing in x and so changes sign once. This means that for low x
an increase in x raises Gw, whereas for higher values of x a higher x reduces it.
Hence, Gw is inverted U-shaped in x.
3.2 Inequality in Personal Factor Incomes
Recently the relationship between the distribution of personal incomes and growth
has been analyzed in a number of contributions. Here we concentrate on the two
prime components of personal incomes, namely, the sum of wage and capital in-
come per person. Thus, each individual has income wit+rkit at time t for i = h, l.
In the model all agents accumulate capital at the same rate so that kit and, thus,
rkit is the same for all agents. Recall that r = (1−α)(1+xα). In what follows we
will drop the time subscript again for convenience. Then mean personal factor
income is
µp = µw + rk = (1 + x
α)k
where the superscript p denotes variables relating to personal (factor) incomes.
Again we consider the effects of changes in x on the Lorenz curve.25 To this
end we look at the slopes of the lower and upper line segment of the LC. For the
25Of course, now the y-axis in figure 1 denotes the share of personal incomes in total personal
incomes.
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lower segment we define in analogy to the previous subsection
λp ≡ wl + rk
µp
=
wl
µp
+ (1− α) = α
1 + xα
+ (1− α)
because rk
µp
= (1−α)(1+x
α)k
(1+xα)k
= 1− α. Then
dλp
dx
= −α
2xα−1
1 + xα
< 0 and
d2λp
dx2
= −α
2(α− 1)xα−2(1 + xα)− α3x2α−2
1 + xα
> 0. (12)
Thus, λp is decreasing in x.
Similarly, for the upper segment of the LC, Λp, we get
Λp ≡ wh + rk
µp
=
wh
µp
+ (1− α) = piwl
µp
+ (1− α) = piλp + (1− α),
because wh = piwl and λ
p = wl
µp
. The segment reacts negatively to a change in x,
since
dΛp
dx
=
dpi
dx
λp + pi
dλp
dx
< 0,
as both derivatives on the RHS are negative.
Thus, the new Lorenz curve with a higher x cuts the old Lorenz curve from
below as in figure 1. This implies that no Lorenz dominance for the distribution
of personal incomes holds.
For the analysis of the Gini coefficient for personal incomes, Gp, we define
the share of personal factor incomes of the low-skilled in total personal factor
incomes as
spl ≡
(wl + rk)(1− x)
µp
= (1− x)λp + (1− x)(1− α).
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With this the Gini coefficient for factor incomes is given by
Gp = 1− 2
[
(1− x) spl
2
+ xspl +
(1− spl )x
2
]
= 1− (spl + x). (13)
Changing x implies
dGp
dx
= −ds
p
l
dx
− 1 = −
[
−λp + (1− x)dλ
p
dx
]
− 1.
Again, we find lim
x→0
dGp
dx
= +∞, lim
x→1
dGp
dx
< 0 and
d2Gp
dx2
=
dλp
dx
− (1− x)d
2λp
dx2
+
dλp
dx
< 0
for all x ∈ [0, 1], since dλp
dx
< 0 and d
2λp
dx2
> 0 by (12). Hence, by the same
arguments as in the previous subsection Gp is also inverted U-shaped in x.
3.3 Implications
The properties of the model have implications for empirical work. As regards the
main theoretical predictions it is convenient to summarize them in the following
propositions.
Proposition 1 Wage and personal factor income inequality changes due to an
increase in x cannot unambiguously be ranked according to the Lorenz-dominance
criterion. Wage and personal income inequality does not necessarily decrease
when the number of high-skilled people increases and inequality is assessed by the
Lorenz dominance criterion.
Proposition 2 When wage or personal factor income inequality is measured by
the Gini coefficient, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality
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and the fraction of high-skilled people in the population.
A further result follows, when one compares the Gini coefficients for wage and
for factor income. In this context, one finds Gp < Gw.26 Thus,
Proposition 3 For positive x, inequality in wage incomes is higher than in-
equality in factor incomes when inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient,
i.e. Gw > Gp.
These results raise three issues for empirical analyses.
First, The Gini coefficient for personal factor incomes in equation (13) has
been derived under the assumption of equal capital ownership and income. In re-
ality, the capital income component of the distribution of personal gross (factor)
incomes affects (often reduces) measured inequality. The model’s Gini coeffi-
cients, thus, capture that the main source of inequality stems from wage inequal-
ity.
In this context some snap-shot evidence may be useful. The following ta-
ble presents Gini indices for the distribution of households’ total factor income
(proxied in the model by Gp), the distribution of households’ factor incomes mi-
nus incomes from property (proxied in the model by Gw), which corresponds to
the sum of gross wages, salaries and self employment income, and the distrib-
ution of households’ factor income minus property and self employment income
(denoted Gw2 ), which (mostly) corresponds to gross wages and salaries, for six
of the G7 countries around 2000, calculated from micro data provided by the
26We have Gp < Gw ⇔ swl < spl . But
swl < s
p
l ⇔
(wl + rk)(1− x)
(1 + xα)k
<
(1− x)wl
(1 + xα)αk
⇔ (wl + rk) > k
and so αk + (1− α)(1 + xα)k > k ⇔ 1 + (1− α)xα > 1 which is true.
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Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).27
Table 1: Gini coefficients based on LIS
Gini United States Canada France Germany Italy United Kingdom
Gp 0.462 0.419 0.466 0.458 0.451 0.546
Gw 0.469 0.432 0.485 0.468 0.453 0.559
Gw2 0.483 0.450 0.514 0.504 0.549 0.583
Cross-country comparisons of the coefficients are problematic, because some
countries’ data refer to net rather than gross wages. However, the Gini coefficients
are based on consistent concepts for each country. As one can see moving from
measured inequality in wages to inequality in factor income (roughly wages and
capital income) reduces inequality when measured by the Gini coefficient for
each country considered. This appears to corroborate the feature of the model
captured in proposition 3.
Second, households, which are often the unit of analysis in cross-country work,
may consist of people with different educational backgrounds. However, when
household surveys are based on observations of individual units, the Gini coeffi-
cient would not change its informational content if there was a rearrangement of
persons into high or low-skilled groups.
Third, two values of x may be associated with the same value of the Gini
coefficient and the income distribution with the higher x has a higher mean
income. This reflects that the Lorenz curves intersect so that clear rankings
27I have calculated the Gini coefficients using standard routines provided by LIS at
www.lisproject.org. The income recipient is the household. The income unit is household
equivalized income, where the equivalence scale is the square root of household members. The
income data have been bottom and top-coded for each country, following suggestions by LIS
for obtaining a range of inequality measures including the Gini index. The data for the United
States, Canada, Germany and Italy are for the year 2000, those for the United Kingdom for the
year 1999 and the French data are for the year 1994. The wages and salaries data for France
and Italy are for net rather than gross wages. Property income is given by LIS as cash property
income which includes cash interest, rent, dividends, annuities, royalties, etc., but excludes
e.g. capital gains. A detailed description of how the coefficients were obtained and what LIS
variables have been used is provided in appendix D.
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of income distributions would in general not be possible. See Atkinson (1970)
and, in particular, Fields (1987) or Amiel and Cowell (1999), chpt. 6, who show
that the Gini coefficient usually generates a Kuznets curve by construction, when
incomes are rising. Thus, measurement issues are important and may not have
received enough attention in the macroeconomics and growth literature.
For the model that raises an important point. Suppose the economies were
identical except for their composition of human capital. Then countries should
have a higher mean income and possibly lower or higher inequality if the number
of high-skilled people increases and if (wage or total factor) income inequality is
measured by the Gini coefficient.
4 Growth and measured income inequality
In this section we focus on the model’s predictions on the relationship between
growth and income inequality when x changes within a particular country. This
relationship is not clear when income inequality is measured by the Gini coef-
ficient. Both growth and measured inequality, are inverted U-shaped functions
of x. For what follows we need not distinguish between the Gini coefficient for
wages, Gw, or for personal factor incomes, Gp, because all arguments will apply
to both of them. Thus, in this section we will denote the Gini coefficient simply
by G.
Now, we know that the growth rate attains its maximum when x = xˆ ≡
[α(1− α)] 1−α . Depending on a country’s α and  the growth maximizing xˆ
may be to the left or to the right of the x where the Gini coefficient attains its
maximum. Let that point be denoted by x˜. The following figures visualize the
possible cases, assuming that xˆ = x˜ is in general very unlikely.
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Figure 2: Growth and the Gini I
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Figure 3: Growth and the Gini II
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Figures 2 and 3 show that for sufficiently low x (regimes I and IV) the growth
rate and the Gini coefficient are increasing in x. Thus, for a country that is suffi-
ciently poor in human capital we should observe that income inequality, measured
by the Gini coefficient, and growth are positively associated. Similarly, for suf-
ficiently high x the growth rate and income inequality are both decreasing in x
(regimes III and VI). Thus, in a country that overinvests in human capital more
of it reduces growth and measured income inequality.
In regime II, where xˆ < x˜, a country has more human capital than is good for
growth, but inequality is still rising with an increase in x. Thus, the association
between growth and income inequality would be observed to be negative in this
case. In regime V, where xˆ < x˜, a country has not attained the number of high
skilled people necessary to maximize growth. But any increase in x would lower
inequality and increase growth. Thus, the observed relation between inequality
and growth would also be negative.
To summarize the possible regimes, we have for an increase in x
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I II III
γ ↑, G ↑ γ ↓, G ↑ γ ↓, G ↓
IV V VI
γ ↑, G ↑ γ ↑, G ↓ γ ↓, G ↓
If one views increases in x as reflecting the development process it becomes
clear that for a given production (α) and education () technology the relation-
ship between growth and income inequality would in general be very difficult to
predict. For instance, the same value of the Gini coefficient may be associated
with two different growth rates. Furthermore, the parameters for the production
and schooling technologies have to be taken as constant. Thus, no clear func-
tional relationship would in general hold between growth and income inequality,
when measured by the Gini coefficient.
This becomes clearer, if we plot the growth rate against the Gini coefficient,
implied by figures 2 and 3. As can be seen, the same Gini coefficient can be
associated with relatively higher or lower growth. For example, at point C in
figure 4 inequality is maximal. If we then observed lower inequality (a decrease
in inequality), this may be associated with higher or lower growth.28 But whether
one moves in the direction of A (higher growth) or B (lower growth) would depend
on how x changes and whether we are moving between regimes II and III, or
between regimes IV and V.
28A similar result is obtained by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) who look at the effect of (net)
changes in inequality on the growth rate. They find that changes in inequality (in any direc-
tion) are associated with lower (future) growth rates. In this paper, however, no such clear
relationship between changes in inequality and the growth rate holds.
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Figure 4: The growth-inequality relationship
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The lack of a clear functional relationship between measured inequality and
economic growth may have important consequences for empirical work. Many
studies find that growth and indicators of the inequality of personal incomes,
including the Gini coefficient, are negatively associated in cross-sections of coun-
tries. This could be explained by the model when assuming that most countries
are in regime V, figure 3, and when assuming that α and  are the same for
all countries. In that regime more human capital reduces income inequality and
increases growth. Thus, some empirical studies may be interpreted as providing
evidence that the majority of countries are indeed in that regime - under the
maintained assumption of equal technological parameters and a distribution of x
supporting that regime.
As the analysis shows one would in general need to know for empirical work
where the turning points of the Gini coefficient and the growth rate would be.
In particular, this would imply knowledge of parameters governing the produc-
tion and schooling technology. To obtain that knowledge for a particular country
would require a careful analysis of these technologies. For a cross-section of coun-
tries it would additionally require an analysis of how x, α and  are distributed
empirically.
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A key implication of the analysis is that linear, empirical models (e.g. simple
growth regressions with human capital and Gini coefficients as regressors) may
miss the richness that may underlie the nonlinear relationship between economic
growth and income inequality, when both are jointly determined by the level of
human capital (or, ultimately, by the political economy considerations that lead
to a particular level of human capital).
However, even in light of the present analysis it may be argued that linear
empirical models are still of considerable value. If interpreted as approximations
to an underlying nonlinear relationship, conventional growth regressions, which
include indicators of human capital and the income distribution as regressors,
may still provide important information.
5 Concluding Remarks
It is commonly argued that there is a link from education to income inequality
and growth. The paper focuses on a supply-driven explanation of how that link
may operate.
In the model education directly affects income inequality and growth. It is
found that the effects of more education on income inequality cannot be un-
ambiguously ascertained when inequality is assessed by the Lorenz dominance
criterion. Increases in education first increase and then decrease growth as well
as income inequality, when measured by the Gini coefficient. There is no clear
functional relationship between growth and measured income inequality. If one
conditions on inequality and human capital in growth regressions, the effect of in-
equality on growth may be spurious, but may still provide important information
on the nonlinear relationship between growth and education.
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In the model this relationship depends on the level of human capital as well as
structural parameters for the education and production technology. The paper
argues that determination of these may be crucial when analyzing the inequality-
growth nexus.
Clearly, differences in educational level in time or across countries may be
due to many things such as policy, history, labour market conditions, physical
and human capital equipment used in schooling, laws, school financing (fees) etc.
Furthermore, the differences may also reflect different demand conditions.
Untangling the precise demand-supply relationships between human capital,
production and education technologies, and institutions in the explanation of
growth or inequality is interesting ongoing research. An all comprehensive analy-
sis of these links has been beyond the scope of this paper. These and other
problems are left for future research.
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A Technology
By assumption Yt = AtHαt K
1−α
t , where the index of effective labour H depends on
labour requiring basic skills (B) and labour requiring high skills (S). Labour requiring
basic skills is performed by high and low-skilled persons, B = B(Ll, Lh), whereas
high-skilled labour is only performed by high-skilled persons, S = S(Lh). High and
low-skilled people are perfect substitutes to each other when performing basic skill
(routine) tasks, i.e. B(Ll, Lh) = Ll + Lh. Thus, high-skilled people also perform those
routine tasks a low-skilled person may do.29 On the other hand, only high-skilled people
can perform high-skilled tasks (labour) and for simplicity let S(Lh) = Lh. To capture
the relationship between labour inputs assume H = [Bρ + Sρ]
1
ρ =
[
(Lh + Ll)
ρ + Lρh
] 1
ρ .
For ρ < 1 labour requiring basic skills (B) and labour requiring high skills (S) are
imperfect (less than perfect) substitutes. For ease of calculations let ρ = α < 1 which
yields equation (1).
B Discrete Time Justification for x = τ 
Equation (2) is compatible with many models that also use high-skilled labour as an
input generating education. For instance, let ht denote the total stock of human capital
in the economy in a discrete time model. Assume that human capital evolves according
to ht+1 = f(Gt,Kt, ht)ht where new human capital ht+1 is produced by non-increasing
returns. Here human capital formation would depend on the level of the stock of
knowledge ht, government resources provided for education Gt and the tax base Kt.
The function f(·) governs the evolution of human capital. Assume that it is separable
in the form f(g(Gt,Kt), ht). Let g = c
(
Gt
Kt
)
= c(τ) and for simplicity
ht+1 = c(τ) h
β
t , where c ≥ 0, c′ > 0, c′′ ≤ 0, 0 < β < 1.
where β measures the productivity of the education sector and c(τ) captures the quality
of education, depending on the government resources channelled into education. For a
similar expression see, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) eqns. (1), (2) and
many other contributions.
In the model human capital is carried discretely so ht = xtN . Normalize population
by setting N = 1. Then total human capital at date t is given by xt. In steady state
29For instance, Lindbeck and Snower (1996) show that firms may organize production so
that people perform one particular task (Tayloristic organization) or various tasks (holistic
organization). In the model only high-skilled people are capable of performing several tasks
and firms use a mixture of Tayloristic and holistic organization.
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x¯ = xt = xt+1 and so x¯ = c(τ)
1
1−β . Next suppose that the efficiency of the education
sector is described by c(τ) = τµ where 0 < µ < 1. For non-increasing returns to
scale it is necessary that µ + β ≤ 1. Let µ1−β ≡  then the more explicit set-up would
be equivalent to (2) in steady state. As x¯ < 0, any increase in  would mean that
less human capital is generated in steady state. From non-increasing returns to scale
it follows that µ ≤ 1 − β so that  ≤ 1. Hence,  = 1 would represent a relatively
unproductive human capital formation process.
C Derivation of the Steady State Equilibrium
Let R ≡ (r − τ) and notice that R is constant in equilibrium. Consumption grows at
γ ≡ ˙citcit = R − ρ. As R is the same for high- and low-skilled individuals γ =
˙cht
cht
= ˙cltclt .
Furthermore, cit = ci0 e(R−ρ)t where ci0 remains to be determined.
Integrating the budget constraint (5) from time 0 to some time T gives∫ T
0
cit e
Rtdt+ kiT =
∫ T
0
wit e
Rtdt+ ki0eRtdt. (C1)
Multiplying both sides by e−Rt, that is, discounting to time 0, letting T go to ∞, and
using the transversality condition (7) with constant R yields∫ ∞
0
cit e
−Rtdt =
∫ ∞
0
wit e
−Rtdt+ ki0. (C2)
Thus, the individuals set their present value of consumption equal to the sum of their
initial wealth and the present value of their wages.
As cit = ci0 e(R−ρ)t for a given value of initial consumption ci0, we can substitute
in (C2) to get ∫ ∞
0
ci0 e
(Rs−ρ)t e−Rtdt =
∫ ∞
0
wit e
−Rtdt+ ki0
ci0 = ρ
∫ ∞
0
wit e
−Rtdt+ ρ ki0 (C3)
Thus, in the optimum the agents’ initial consumption depends on initial wealth holdings
and the present value value of their labour income.
Next, we divide the individual’s budget constraint (5) by kit to get
γki =
k˙it
kit
=
wit
kit
+
Rkit
kit
− cit
kit
. (C4)
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In equilibrium cit = ci0 eγt where γ = ˙citcit . Substituting this, equation (C3), and the
expressions for kit, wit and kt under the condition γkh = γkl = γk and kh0 = kl0 = k0
in (C4) yields
γki =
di k0e
γkt
k0eγkt
+R− ρk0 e
γt
k0eγkt
− ρ
∫∞
0 wit e
−Rtdt eγt
k0eγkt
= di +R− ρe(γ−γk)t − ρdi
∫ ∞
0
e(γk−R)tdt e(γ−γk)t, (C5)
where wit = dikt, and dh ≡ α(1 + xα−1) and dl ≡ α are constant.
The transversality condition (7) requires that γk < R for the integral expression in
the equation above to converge.
Suppose γk < γ < R. Then γki would decrease over time, and would eventually
become negative. Production would fall and wages as well as capital income would
decline. This is incompatible with a plan to have growing consumption and cannot be
optimal.
Suppose γ < γk < R. Then γki would increase over time. As t → ∞, it would
clearly be larger than R which violates the transversality condition. That cannot be
an equilibrium either.
Suppose γ = γk. In that case (C4) becomes
γki = di +R− ρ− ρ
di
ρ
= R− ρ = r − τ − ρ (= γ)
which is indeed true. Hence, γkh = γkl = γk = γy = γ = γch = γcl = r − τ − ρ in
equilibrium.
As cit, wit, kit, kt and Yt = Nkt(1 + xα) begin at the values ci0 = dik0, wi0 =
dik0, ki0, k0 and Y0 = Nk0(1+xα), where di, N = 1, (1+xα) are constant, these variables
grow at the same rate from time 0 onwards. Thus, the model has no transitional
dynamics. See also e.g. Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), p. 143.
D Data Appendix
D.1 The Calculation of the Gini coefficients
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) at www.lisproject.org provides micro data for the
following income variables:
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Income Variable Variable Name
Factor Income FI
Cash Property Income V8
Farm self-employment income V4
Non-farm self-employment income V4
Gross wages and salaries V1
SELFI V4+V5
The Gini coefficients for Gp were calculated from FI. Gp was calculated from
FI − V 8, treating self-employment income as a component of wages, and Gp2 from
FI −V 8−SELFI, treating self-employment income as capital owning individuals’ re-
muneration (income). The cash property income variable V 8 comprises cash interest,
rent, dividends, annuities, royalties, etc., but it excludes capital gains, lottery win-
nings, inheritances, insurance settlements, and all other one-off lump sum payments.
See www.lisproject.org/techdoc/variables.htm for more details.
Thus, Gw and Gw2 capture wage incomes, although they are not always for gross
wages, since the data for France and Italy refer to net wages. Thus, comparisons across
countries may be problematic, but comparisons within countries are possible.
The income data were transformed into equivalized income, by adjusting the income
per household by the square root of household members. The resulting data were then
bottom- and top-coded. The bottom-code was set at 0.01% of equivalent mean income.
(This allows for very low incomes to be included in the calculations. LIS suggests 1%.)
The STATA programme first creates the variable botlin equal to 0.01% of average
equivalized income, then replaces the equivalised income by that value in case it is
lower than it. The top-code was set at 1000 times median unequivalized wage or factor
income. (This allows for very high incomes to be included in the calculations. LIS uses
the factor 10.) First a variable toplin is created which is equal to 1000 times the median
unequivalized income (eg. FI), then replaces equivalized income by the equivalized value
of toplin in case FI etc. is higher than toplin. With these adjustments the programme
then calculated a variety of inequality indices, including the Gini coefficient.
More detailed information on these procedures can be found at www.lisproject.org.
The STATA programme code and the resulting detailed output for this paper’s Gini
coefficients are available from the author on request.
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